Deporting the Addicted: Arguments for the Repeal of Section 237(A)(2)(B)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act by Manning, Colleen
Boston College Law Review
Volume 38
Issue 5 Number 5 Article 5
9-1-1997
Deporting the Addicted: Arguments for the Repeal
of Section 237(A)(2)(B)(II) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act
Colleen Manning
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Immigration Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Colleen Manning, Deporting the Addicted: Arguments for the Repeal of Section 237(A)(2)(B)(II) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 38 B.C.L. Rev. 977 (1997), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/
vol38/iss5/5
DEPORTING THE ADDICTED:
ARGUMENTS FOR THE REPEAL OF
SECTION 237(A)(2)(B)(II) OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following three scenarios. Jacques, a French national,
came to the United States as a lawful permanent resident four years
ago to marry his wife, a United States citizen. They are expecting their
first child in six months. They have lived continuously in Philadelphia
where they intend to build a life and raise their child. Jacques remains
in the United States as a lawful permanent resident and has elected
not to pursue citizenship, as he is proud of his French heritage and
wishes to maintain status as a French citizen. Within the past. two years,
Jacques has unfortunately experimented with and become addicted to
amphetamines. In an effort to cure this problem, Jacques and his wife
decided to seek help at a local drug clinic.
Carlos, a thirty-year-old Mexican citizen, entered the United States
illegally fifteen years ago with his mother. They have remained in the
San Diego area since then. Carlos earns a living in a shoe factory and
is his mother's sole provider. He leads a relatively unremarkable life
and has never been in trouble with the law. Over the past five years,
Carlos has gradually become dependent on alcohol, specifically hard
alcohol such as vodka. As the dependence became more severe, it
began to interfere in Carlos's life. To regain control, he began attend-
ing Alcoholics Anonymous meetings at a local church. A month ago,
the shoe factory laid him off, and, on his way home to break the
unfortunate news to his mother, he stopped off at a neighborhood bar
and had a few drinks. While walking home, he stumbled a couple of
times, and, when approached by a police officer, he slurred his words.
The officer arrested Carlos for public drunkenness. Carlos and his
attorney have decided that at his arraignment next week, Carlos should
plead guilty and ask the judge for leniency due to his addiction.'
This hypothetical assumes that the "public drunkenness" conviction by way of a guilty plea
would not by itself constitute a ground or deportation under INA § 237(a) (2) (A) (i) (crimes of
moral turpitude) nor under INA § 237 (a)(2) (A) (ii) (multiple criminal convictions). See Immi-
gration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii), 8 U.S.C.A § 1227(a) (2) (B) (ii) (West
1996).
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Madeline, an Italian citizen, came to the United States as a child
seventy years ago. As a lawful permanent resident, she lives in Buffalo
where she raised her seven children and saw her many grandchildren
and great-grandchildren grow up. Madeline, whose husband died ten
years ago, lives a simple life, supplemented only by her social security
checks and her late husband's meager pension. Five years ago, a doctor
diagnosed Madeline with liver cancer. In an effort to provide Madeline
comfort in her last years, her doctor prescribed morphine to dull the
pain. Madeline's cancer is now in remission, but she has since become
severely addicted to the pain killers. The addiction is destroying her
relationship with her dozens of grandchildren and great-grandchil-
dren. As a family, they decide to have her committed to a drug reha-
bilitation clinic so that she will be able to enjoy her final years drug-
free.
Section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA") states that any alien who is a drug abuser or addict is deport-
able.2
 In each of the above scenarios, the non-citizen in question risks
deportation under this provision if the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service ("INS") somehow learns of the alien's addiction' Section
237(a) lists all of the current deportation grounds, but subsection
(a) (2) (B) (ii) in particular brushes up against several constitutional
boundaries.4
This Note argues for the repeal of section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) based
on several arguments challenging the constitutionality of this provi-
sion. 5
 Part I of the Note examines the history of the immigration acts
and the development of the congressional power to deport.' Part II
examines possible constitutional violations of section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii)
including violations of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause and the Fifth Amendment procedural and substan-
tive due process protections.? Finally, Part III argues that section
237(a) (2) (B) (ii) is unconstitutionally vague because it draws no dis-
2
 ld. § 237(a)(2)(5)(ii). INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that "[a] ny alien who is, or at any
time after admission has been, a drug abuser or addict is deportable." Id. This provision was
formerly within [NA section 241, but the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act of 1996 ("IIRAIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C., 110 Stat. 3009 amended the INA
and re-designated the section to be set out as 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
3 See INA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii).
1
 Id. § 237(a); see id. § 237(a)(2)(B)(ii).
5 See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 9-63 and accompanying text ..
7 See INA § 237(a) (2) (b) (ii); see also infra notes 64-272 and accompanying text.
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tinctions as to what particular types of drugs, nor what degree of
addiction or abuse, would warrant deportation. 8
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE AND THE
EVOLUTION OF CONGRESS'S RIGHT TO DEPORT
Since the late 1800s, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that Congress has the complete power, as an incident of sover-
eignty, to exclude foreigners. 9 This plenary power was and continues
to be the basis for all immigration legislation as it relates to restricting
the types of individuals who are allowed to cross the United States
border and regulating the types of individuals who are allowed to stay.'°
In 1888, in Chae Chan Ping v. United States ("Chinese Exclusion
Case"), the United States Supreme Court held that the power of exclu-
sion of foreigners is an incident of sovereignty and thus Congress has
the plenary power to pass legislation that excludes foreigners from the
United States." Chae Chan Ping was a Chinese laborer who entered
the United States in 1875 and lived in San Francisco until 1887.' 2 In
1887, he left for a visit to China, and upon his return, the INS denied
him admission pursuant to an 1888 act that prohibited the return of
all Chinese laborers who had left the United States.' 3 The Court re-
jected Chae Chan Ping's various constitutional challenges to the Act
of 1888, reasoning that the congressional power to restrict immigration
was an important element of maintaining sovereignty.' 4 The Court
8 See INA § 237(a) (2) (b) (ii); see also infra notes 273-91 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); Massieu v. Reno, 915
F. Supp. 681, 698 (fin 1996) (reiterating that legislative power over admission of aliens is
absolute).
10 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U,S. 580, 586-87 (1952) (holding that an alien's
status in this country is a matter of Congressional permission and tolerance, and an alien has 110
constitutional right to remain in the United Stales); United States v. Oboh, 92 F.3d 1082, 1087
(11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1257 (1997) (same).
11 130 U.S. at 609.
12 See id. at 582.
13 See id. In 1882, Congress passed an act which suspended the immigration of Chinese
laborers for ten years. See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 ("Act of 1882"); THOMAS
ALEXANDER ALE1NIKOEF EX AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POI.ICY 4 (3d ed. 1995). Because it
was not Congress's intent for the Act of 1882 to affect Chinese laborers who were already in the
United States, the statute established a procedure for the issuance of "certificates of identity" so
that if a Chinese laborer chose to leave for a visit, he could re-enter. Act of 1882 § 4; see
ALEINIROFF, supra. Prior to his departure, Chae Chan Ping complied with the Act of 1882 and
obtained a certificate of identity, believing that such certificate would entitle him to re-enter the
United States without a problem. See. Owe Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582. Congress passed another
act in 1888, however, that prohibited the return of all Chinese laborers who had left the United
States regardless of whether or not they obtained their certificates pursuant to the Act of 1882.
SeeAct of Sept. 13, 1888, eh. 1015, 25 Stilt. 476 ("Act of 1888"); ALEINIKOFF, Supra.
14 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 608, 609. Chae Chan Ping argued that the Act of 1888 was
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stated that not only does the government have the right to regulate
immigration, but the government has the duty to do so in order to
protect the country's independence.'' The Court concluded that a
sovereign nation has the inherent right and the plenary power to
exclude foreigners and that such a right cannot be granted away or
restrained." The Supreme Court thus held that Congress's refusal to
allow Chae Chan Ping reentry into the United States was a valid
exercise of legislative power. 17
It was in this Chinese Exclusion Case that the Supreme Court first
discussed the plenary power doctrine, which essentially placed unfet-
tered authority with respect to immigration laws and restrictions in the
hands of the federal government's The plenary power doctrine finds
its roots in the concept of absolute and inherent sovereignty, though
there is no one particular provision in the Constitution from which it
can find support.'"
Four years later, in 1892, in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the Immigration Act of 1891
("Act of 1891"), which codified existing exclusion laws and provided
for exclusive inspection of aliens by the federal government.'" When
petitioner, Nishimura Ekiu, arrived at the United States border in 1891,
unconstitutional for several reasons. See id. at 584-89. First, he argued that the Act of 1888
contravened the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 which recognized that an alien has an "inherent and
inalienable right ... to change his home and allegiance" as well as the "mutual advantage of free
migration and emigration of [American and Chinese] citizens." Id. at 585. Second, he claimed
that the INS detained him without due process, and thus in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
See id. at 584. Third, he argued that he had a vested right to return to the United States because
he had previously lived there as a peaceable resident. See id. at 586-88. Fourth, Chae Chan Ping
argued that the Act of 1888 violated the ex post facto prohibition in the Constitution because it
was applied retroactively. See id. at 589. The Court rejected all of Chat: Chan Ping's arguments.
Id. at 603,609.
16 Id. at 605-06.
16 Id. at 609.
17 Id. at 605-06,609.
18 See id., at 605-06, 609; Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis.
L. REV. 965,965 (1993); see also Landon v. Piasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (holding that control
over matters of immigration is a sovereign prerogative).
18 See Scaperlanda, supra note 18, at 972. Although no one particular provision of the
Constitution provides a justification for the plenary power to regulate immigration, commentators
have suggested that there are several possible constitutional clauses or doctrines that may apply.
See ALEINIKOFF, SUPra note 13, at 8-14. The power to regulate immigration may stem from the
Commerce Power, U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the Naturalization Power, U.S. Colsix -r. art. I, § 8,
cl. 4, the Migration and Importation Clause, U.S. CousT. art. 1, § 9, cl. I. the Foreign Affairs
Power, or, as the Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case held, the power may stem from inherent
powers of a sovereign nation. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609; ALEIN1Korr, supra note 13, at
8-14.
20 Act of March 3,1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 St-at. 1084 ("Act of 1891"); Nishimura Ekiu v. United
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an inspector refused to allow her to enter pursuant to an 1882 act that
required exclusion of an alien if the inspector believed that the alien
would likely become a public charge."' The main issue in this case was
the validity and effect of the inspector's actions, and Nishimura argued
that the inspector did not have the authority to order exclusion be-
cause the Secretary of the Treasury (rather than the Superintendent
of Immigration) had appointed him."' The Court rejected Nishimura's
argument on the grounds that the Act of 1891 specifically delegated
to the Secretary of the Treasury the power to appoint immigration
inspectors. 23 The Court, in an often cited passage, reiterated its reliance
on the plenary power doctrine as a means of settling immigration
issues:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sov-
ereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self preservation, to forbid the entrance of for-
eigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe."
The Court concluded that pursuant to the plenary power to regu-
late immigration, Congress had the authority to pass legislation that
delegated authority to the Secretary of the Treasury and, therefore,
the Act of 1891 was constitutional and valid." The Court thus affir-
med the Secretary's decision to exclude Nishimura.'
The aliens in the Chinese Exclusion Case and Nishimura were seek-
ing entry into the United States, and thus the issue in their cases was
whether the exclusion from entry was proper. 27 Exclusion, however, was
not the only means available to Congress in regulating immigration. 28
Slates, 142 U.S. 651, 6(14 (1892); see ALEINIKOFF, supra note la, at 14. Section 7 of the Act of 1891
established the office of superintendent of immigration and provided the basis for his or her
power. See Act of 1 H91 § 7; Nishimura, 142 U.S. at 662.
21 See Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214 ("Act of Aug. 1882"); Nishimura, 142 U.S.
at 652, 661. The Act of Aug. 1882 provided that the Secretary of the Treasury had the duty to
examine the immigrants who are seeking entry, and "iron such examination there shall be found
among such passengers any convict, lunatic, idiot or any person unable to take care of himself
or herself without becoming a public charge, ... such persons shall not he permitted to land."
Act of Aug. 1882 § 2; see Nishimura, 142 U.S. at 661.
22 See Nishimura, 142 U.S. at 662-63.
29
	 at 663.
24 Id. at 659.
25 Id. at 659, 664.
26 Id. at 664.
27 Nishimura, 142 U.S. al 652; Ghat: Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 581-82.
28 See ALEINucurF, supra note 13, at 511 -12.
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Congress also had the power to pass legislation regarding the ability
to deport aliens who were already within the United States borders.`'
In 1888, Congress enacted the first permanent deportation stat-
utes. 3° One of these statutes required the removal, at any time after
entry, of all persons of Chinese descent who were found inside the
United States in violation of the law. 31 The other statute required the
removal by administrative process, within one year after entry, of all
aliens who had landed in violation of the 1885 and 1887 contract labor
laws prohibiting the importation or migration of aliens who had pre-
existing contracts to work in the United States." Congress amended
the deportation laws in 1892 to state that all Chinese laborers in the
United States were required to obtain a certificate of residence from
the Collector of Internal Revenue, and, according to the regulations
promulgated pursuant to this amendment, the Collector would only
issue a certificate on the "affidavit of at least one credible white wit-
ness."33 The Act of 1892 provided that the government could arrest
and deport any alien who failed to acquire this certificate within the
requisite time period. 34
29 See id. Deportation refers to the removal of a non-citizen who is within the United States
borders, and exclusion refers to the non-admittance of a non-citizen who is waiting at the border.
See id. at 20-21. Traditionally, the amount of due process the INS affords to an alien depends on
which proceeding the INS has commenced against the alien. See id. at 512. In deportation
proceedings, the alien has generally had more due process rights, both procedural and substan-
tive, and these rights are based in part on the notion that once someone is within the border, he
or she has a "stake" or a vested interest. See, e.g., Kaoru Yaniataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903)
(holding that an alien who has entered the country is entitled to due process under the Fifth
Amendment and cannot be deported without an opportunity for a hearing); Caballero v. Caplin-
ger, 914 F. Supp. 1374, 1376 (ED. La. 1996) (holding that aliens in deportation proceedings are
entitled to constitutional protections of clue process). Conversely, an alien in exclusion proceed-
ings has significantly less due process rights. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 212 (1053) (stating that an alien at the border stands on a different footing than
an alien who is already within the border); United States ex rd. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress, it is due process as far as an
alien is concerned.") In the recently enacted IIRAIRA, the distinction between deportation and
exclusion proceedings has been eradicated. IIRAIRA § 301, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C., 110
Stat. 3009 (1996) (to be codified 8 U.S.C. § 1229). It is unclear what effect abolishing this
distinction will have on the particular rights afforded to an alien in a given proceeding. The
proceeding for either category is now termed "Removal Proceedings." See id. § 304.
" See Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 566 ("Act of Oct. 1888"); Act of Sept. 13, 1888,
ch. 1015, § 13, 25 Stat. 476 ("Act of Sept. 1888"); Will Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law:
Proposals for Reform, 56 Coukf. L. REV. 309, 312 (1956).
31 See Act of Sept. 1888; Maslow, supra note 30, at 312.
112 See Act of Oct. 1888 (amended Act of Feh. 26, 1885, ch, 164, 23 Stat. 332 and Act of Feb.
23, 1887, ch. 220, 24 Stat. 414); Maslow, supra note 30, at 312.
"Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60 § 6, 27 Stat. 25 ("Act of 1892"); see ALEINHEOFF, supra note 13,
at 21.
34 Act of 1892; see ALEINIKOFF, supra note 13, at 21.
September 19971	 DEPORTING THE ADDICTED	 983
In 1893, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act of 1892 and ruled
that Congress had the absolute right, pursuant to the plenary power
doctrine and the notion of inherent sovereignty, to pass deportation
legislation. 35
 The INS arrested Fong Yue Ting, a Chinese laborer, for
failure to produce a certificate of residence as required by the Act of
1892. 36
 An immigration judge subsequently ordered Fong Yue Ting's
deportation because he could not establish his residency through the
testimony of at least one credible white witness. 37 The Court rejected
Fong Yue Ting's claims that he was deprived of life, liberty and property
without due process of law." The Court stated that the right to deport
immigrants who have not been naturalized or taken any steps toward
becoming citizens is as absolute and unqualified as the right to ex-
clude. 39 The Court relied on the plenary power doctrine to uphold the
constitutionality of the Act of 1892 and held that the power to exclude
aliens as well as the power to expel them is an inherent power incident
to sovereignty.40
 The Court thus upheld Fong Yue Ting's deportation
order.'"
In 1907, Congress expanded the immigration law to provide for
the deportation of aliens engaged in prostitution and aliens who had
become public charges due to conditions that existed prior to their
entry into the United States. 42
 In 1917, Congress again extended the
deportation grounds to include all those who became public charges
from pre-entry causes and those who were sentenced to jail for two or
33
 Act of 1892; 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893).
36 See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 702.
37 See id. at 704.
38 Id. at 730. In his dissent, justice Brewer argued that the act is unconstitutional because it
imposes punishment without due process of law. Id. at 733 (Brewer, J., dissenting). He said,
"[dieportation is punishment. It involves first an arrest, a deprival of liberty; and, second, a
removal from home, from family, from business, from property." Id. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
Justice Field, in his dissent, also was unwilling to accept that deportation is not punishment. Id.
at 759 (Field, J., dissenting). He said that "if a banishment of the sort described be not a
punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to
which the name can be applied." Id. at 759 (Field, J., dissenting),
39 Id. at 707. The Court commented on the fact that the Chinese immigrants had taken no
steps toward becoming citizens; yet, until 1943, the law prohibited them from naturalizing. See
Act of May 6, 1882, ch, 126, § 14, 22 Slat. 58, 61 (persons of Chinese origin specifically barred
from naturalization), repealed by Act of Dec, 17, 1943, eh, 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 601; Fong Yue Ting,
149 U.S. at 724; Scaperlanda, supra note 18, at 980 n.56.
49 See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707.
41 Id. at 732.
42 Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 899-900; see Maslow, supra note 30, at 313.
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more crimes involving "moral turpitude."43 This act and subsequent
amendments remained in effect until 1952.44
In 1952, Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Act which required
the deportation of eighteen general classes of aliens:* In this act,
Congress outlined the procedures involved in deporting aliens and
also defined the limited discretion of the Attorney General in depor-
tation proceedings." The McCarran-Walter Act provided, for the first
time, for deportation of aliens addicted to narcotics.47 The act did not
distinguish between those aliens who had cured their addiction and
those who had not." Similarly, the act required deportation even if the
alien never engaged in criminal activity with respect to his addiction
or was a useful member of the community." Critics of this provision
in the McCarran-Walter Act feared that it was an unfair provision,
and they argued for its repea1. 5° Although ultimately overridden, Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt vetoed the provision and stated that nar-
cotics addiction is a lamentable disease and should not be treated as a
crime. 5 '
Despite the criticism, the McCarran-Walter Act, at least with re-
spect to the provision regarding narcotics addiction as a ground for
'IAct of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat, 889; see Maslow, supra note 30, at 313. Adequate
consideration to the meaning of the term "moral turpitude" is beyond the scope of this Note. In
fact, the leading treatise on immigration law states that "]alitempts to arrive at a workable
definition of moral turpitude never have yielded entire satisfaction.... milk term defies precise
definition, since its limits are charted by human experience." AiyamiKorF, supra note 13, at 544
(quoting CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMICRATFON LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 71.05[1] [d] (1994) ).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY provides the most common definition of moral turpitude: "the act
of baseness, vileness or the depravity in private and social duties which man owes to his fellow
man," but even this definition gives little indication of how the courts have struggled to categorize
a particular crime as one involving moral turpitude. litAcx's Law Dicrionra RV 698 (6th ed. 1991);
see ALEINIKOFF, supra note 13, at 544. For examples of how the courts have interpreted "moral
turpitude," see Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951) (holding that crime involves moral
turpitude if fraud is an ingredient) and Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the statutory definition of crime, not the specific conduct that resulted in comic-
don, determines whether the crime includes intent to defraud as an element, and thus one
involving moral turpitude).
44 See Maslow, supra note 30, at 313.
45
 McCarran-Walter Act § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1952); see Maslow, supra note 30, at 314.
46 See McCarran-Walter Act § 242; Maslow, supra note 30, at 317.
4-r
	 Act § 241; Maslow, .supra note 30, at 339. The McCarran-Walter Act
provided for the deportation of any alien who "is, or hereafter at anytime after entry has been,
a narcotic drug addict." McCarran-Walter Act § 241.
48 See McCarran-Walter Act § 241; Maslow, supra note 30, at 339.
4th
	 McCarran-Walter Act § 241; Maslow, supra note 30, at 339.
5° See. Maslow, supra note 30, at 339.
51 See id.
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deportation, remained intact until 1990. 52 The Immigration Act of
1990 amended the grounds of deportation by consolidating the eight-
een categories of deportable aliens into five broader classes." This
statute also amended the language of the drug addiction provision
of the McCarran-Walter Act by dropping the term "narcotic." 54 This
change reflected Congress's recognition that certain drugs, like co-
caine, are not narcotics but are nevertheless addictive, and that abuse
of drugs, even absent addiction, can have a harmful impact on and
pose a danger to society."
The current version of the INA leaves the language with respect
to the addiction provision relatively unchanged. 5" Recent amendments
to this version, however, render the consequences significantly more
harsh in that the possibility for relief is greatly curtailed. 57 The Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") removed
the possibility of a waiver of deportation for deportation orders based
on drug offenses." Prior to the passage of this law, the immigration
statutes provided for discretionary relief of deportation." The AEDPA,
however, eliminated waivers of deportation for any alien who is deport-
able under, inter cilia, section 237(a) (2) (B) (0.6° Under section 304 of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
52
 See McCarran-Walter Act § 241; Immigration Act of 1990 § 602(a) ("Inunigraticm Act of
1990" or "INA"), S U.S.C. § 1251.
55 See INA § 602(a).
54 Compare id. ("Any alien who is, or at any time after entry has been, a drug abuser or addict
is deportable.") (emphasis added) with McCarran-Walter Act § 241 ("[a]ny alien in the United
States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who , . is, or hereafter at any
time after entry, has been a narcotic drug addict . , . .") (emphasis added).
55 See H.R. REP. No. 101-723, at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N, 6710, 6735.
56 See INA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii), S U.S.C.A § 1227(a) (2) (B) (ii) (West 1996). The section num-
bers changed with the passage (tithe IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C., 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
57 See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 440(a) ("AEDPA"), Pub. L.
No. 104-132 (April 24, 1996) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)).
58 ld. The phrase "drug offenses" in this context refers to criminal convictions as well as drug
addiction. See id. Therefore, the AEDPA does not only remove a waiver possibility for those
convicted of drug crimes, but it also removes the possibility for those who are merely addicts, See
id.
ro See INA § 212(c). Although the language in this section appears  to indicate that this
relief is only available in exclusion proceedings, the Attorney General has ruled that section
212(c) relief is likewise available in deportation proceedings. See Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 273
(2d Cir. 1976) (tinkling that fundamental fairness dictates that section 212(c) should apply
in both deportation and exclusion hearings); Dan Kesselbrenner, The "Anti-Terrorisin" Law,
NEws. (National Immigration Project, National Lawyers Guild, Inc., Boston, MA), June
1996, at 7.
u) AEDPA § 440(a); see INA § 237(a) (2) (13) (ii); Kesselbrenner, supra note 59, at 7.
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1996 ("IIRAIRA") there are still some situations where cancellation of
removal is a possible remedy, but those situations are limited and left
entirely to the Attorney General's discretion." In addition, the AEDPA
severely restricts the opportunity for judicial review of a deportation
order. 62
 Thus, even though the current version of the INA with respect
to drug addiction has remained relatively unchanged, by removing
many procedural protections, the AEDPA severely increased the poten-
tial harshness of [NA section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii). 63
 Where there is no
possibility of judicial review and where the only possibility of a waiver
is in the Attorney General's discretion, this provision, if enforced, may
have harsh effects never intended by the original drafters of this pro-
vision.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 237
Although Congress has the plenary power to enact legislation to
restrict immigration as well as the power to enact legislation pertaining
to the rights of an alien to remain in the United States, such laws may
nevertheless violate the Constitution." It is well settled that the judici-
ary applies deferential treatment to such legislation, but Congress must
remain within the confines of the United States Constitution. 65 Con-
gress should thus repeal section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii), or in the alternative,
the courts should declare that section unconstitutional because it vio-
lates several provisions in the Constitution. 66
61 IIRAIRA § 304.
62 AEDPA § 440(a). AEDPA § 440(a) amended 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (a) to read, in pertinent part,
that any final order of deportation as a result of a criminal conviction (which includes deportation
orders based on drug addiction under § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii)) shall not be subject to review by any
court. AEDPA § 440(a); see Duldukao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396, 399-400 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
constitutionality of denial of judicial review stating that there is no constitutional right to judicial
review in deportation cases); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27, 29-30, 31 (2d Cir. 1996) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of denial of judicial review, especially because habeas corpus relief was
still available as a remedy).
63 INA § 237(a) (2) ( B) (ii); AEDPA § 440(a).
64 See Massieu v. Reno, 915 F. Stipp. 681, 698 (1/N,1. 1996) ("[n]otwithstanding the political
branches' near plenary power over aliens, this power is circumscribed by the constitutional
constraints imposed on the exercise of all governmental authority.")
65 See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (stating that the Congress's power over the
admission of aliens is absolute); Mbiya v. INS, 930 F. Supp. 609, 611 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (stating that
although Congress's power to deport is plenary, it is nevertheless subject to judicial intervention
under the paramount law of the Constitution); Chan v. Reno, 916 F. Stipp. 1289, 1296 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (stating that judicial review in immigration matters is narrowly circumscribed); Massieu,
915 F. Stipp. at 698 (D.NJ. 1996) (same).
66 1NA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii); see infra note 292 and accompanying text.
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A. Violation of the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohib-
its cruel and unusual punishment.° Section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) of the
INA violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment because it unconstitutionally characterizes a per-
son as an addict and imposes an extreme consequence due to such
status. 68 Although the Supreme Court has declared that deportation
does not constitute punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amend-
ment protection, this Note analogizes the characterization of "addict"
in the immigration context to those situations in the criminal context
where the Court has found that similar characterizations violate the
Constitution. 69
In 1958, in Trop v. Dulles, the United States Supreme Court struck
down a portion of the nationality law that stripped citizenship from
those convicted of desertion from the military during a war." The
petitioner, a native-born American, deserted the United States Army. 71
In 1952, Trop applied for a passport, but was denied on the ground
that. under section 401(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940, he had lost
his citizenship by reason of his conviction and dishonorable discharge
for wartime desertion. 72 The Court invalidated the expatriation provi-
sion in part because it violated the Eighth Amendment." The Court
stated that the framers of the provision intended expatriation to con-
stitute punishment. 74 Moreover, the Court reasoned that because de-
nationalization destroyed an individual's status in society, it constituted
cruel and unusual punishment." The Court thus concluded that the
Eighth Amendment forbids Congress to punish by taking away citizen-
ship."
'IT U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
See id.; [NA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii).
5° See, e,g„ Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (invalidating as tinconstitu-
thmal under the Eighth Amendment a statute criminalizing an involuntary status); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893) (stating that deportation is not punishment).
70 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
71 See id. at 87.
See Nationality Act of 1940 § 401(g), ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1[37, 1168-69, 8 U.S.C. §§ 501-504,
repealed by Act ofjune 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 280; Trap, 356 U.S. at 88.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
74 Id. at 97.
75 See id. at 101-02.
7f1 Id. at 103.
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In 1962, in Robinson v. California, the United States Supreme
Court held that a statute criminalizing narcotic addiction violated the
Eighth Amendment. 77
 The defendant was a narcotics addict, and the
State charged the defendant with violating a statute that made it a
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for any person to be ad-
dicted to narcotics:7' A police officer arrested the defendant after
observing scar tissue and discoloration on the defendant's arm, and
based on his experiences, the officer determined that the defendant
had used narcotics. 79
 The Court acknowledged that a state has a right
to regulate narcotic drug traffic, but implied that such regulation is
limited to specific acts, such as use, purchase, sale or possession of
narcotics and may not apply to the status of narcotics addiction.'" The
Court stated that narcotic addiction is an illness contracted innocently
or involuntarily." The Court concluded that a state law that imprisons
a diseased individual as a criminal is an infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment unless such addiction is accompanied by a volitional act."'
Thus, the Court reversed Robinson's conviction on the grounds that
the statute upon which he was convicted was unconstitutional under
the Eighth Amendment."3
In 1977, in Ingraham v. Wright, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment protected only those convicted of a crime.'" Pupils
in a junior high school alleged that they were denied their constitu-
tional rights when their teachers used corporal punishment as a means
of discipline.'' In Ingraham, petitioners alleged several incidents of
severe corporal punishment, including an instance where a teacher
paddled one of the petitioners more than twenty times, resulting in a
hematoma requiring medical attention." 6 The Court rejected petition-
ers' claim that the teachers' actions violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment." 7 The Court looked
to the history of the Amendment, as well as to the Court's prior
decisions that construed the proscription against cruel and unusual
77 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
7" See id. at (160, 663.
79 See id. at 662.
88
 See id, at 665-66.
"' Id. at 667,
82 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
83 ld. at 666-67, 668.
"4 43{} U.S. 651, 664 (1977).
85 See id. at 653, 655.
"6 Id. at 657.
87 Id. at 664.
September 1997]	 DEPORTING THE ADDICTED
	 989
punishment to protect only those convicted of crimes." The Court
stated that a schoolchild has little need for the protection of the Eighth
Amendment and thus held that when public school teachers impose
corporal punishment as a disciplinary tool, the Eighth Amendment
does not apply. 89
In 1978, in McJunkin v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that section
241 (a) (11) of the INA did not violate the Eighth Amendment.'"
McJunkin, a citizen of Germany, lawfully entered the United States in
1956.91 Pursuant to the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act ("NARA"),
McJunkin voluntarily sought, and received pursuant to a hearing, an
order of commitment to a drug rehabilitation clinic due to his narcot-
ics addiction."2 The INS received the order of commitment, which
characterized the alien as a drug addict, and the INS used this order
to initiate deportation proceedings against the alien."
McJunkin first argued that the INS could not use a NARA order
as evidence in a deportation proceeding." McJunkin relied on a pro-
vision in the NARA that provides that "[title results of any hearing,
examination, test or procedure to determine narcotic addiction of any
patient under this subchapter shall not be used against such patient in
any criminal proceeding."95
 The court rejected this argument on the
ground that deportation proceedings constitute civil, not criminal,
proceedings and thus this provision of the NARA did not apply."°
McJunkin also argued that admitting this order in a deportation pro-
Id. In his dissent, Justice White disagreed with the majority's limitation on the Eighth
Amendment's prohibitions. See id. at 685 (White, J., dissenting). He looked to the express
language of the.Amendment and determined that there was no such limilatitm. See id. (White,
J., dissenting). He also relied on the fact that the Framers deliberately excluded the word
"criminal" as evidence that the Amendment was designed to prohibit all inhumane or barbaric
punishments regardless of whether the offense was civil or criminal in nature. See id. (White, J.,
dissenting); see also Whitney v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1986) (reiterating that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was only applicable in criminal
adjudications).
8• Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670, 671.
9°579 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1978); see INA § 241(a) (11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (11) (1976).
Section 241 of the INA provided for the deportation of any alien who "is, cir hereafter at any time
after entry has been, a narcotic drug addict ...." INA § 241(a) (11).
91 See McJunkin, 579 E2d at 535.
92 See Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act ("NARA") §§ 2-316, 42 U,S.C, §§ 3401-3426 (1976);
McJunkin, 579 F.2d at 535.
93 See McJunkin, 579 F.2d at 535. The opinion is unclear as to how INS obtained the order
of commitment entered by the district court. See id.
94 See id.
"NARA § 309; see McJunkin, 579 F.2d at 535.
sr McJunkin, 579 F.2d at 535; see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (holding
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ceeding would defeat the reformative purpose of the NARA as it would
ultimately discourage alien addicts from reaping the benefits of the
NARA. 97
 In response, the court stated that it was Congress's task, not
the courts', to change the words of the NARA to include deportation
proceedings."
Secondly, McJunkin argued that the NARA hearing did not estab-
lish an addiction for purposes of deportation.99
 The Ninth Circuit also
rejected this argument, but declined to hold as a matter of law that a
NARA order would automatically provide sufficient evidence in all
deportation cases.""' The court recognized that in each of the proceed-
ings, different standards of proof apply—deportation proceedings re-
quire proof by "clear, convincing and unequivocal language," and
commitment under the NARA is not necessarily as demanding.'"' The
court thus held that an addiction established for NARA purposes
should constitute no more than a prima facie case subject to the alien's
rebuttal.'" In this particular case, however, the court considered the
NARA commitment order sufficient to establish addiction for purposes
of deportation.' 03
McJunkin's third argument challenged the constitutionality of
addiction as a ground for deportation.'"4 McJunkin argued that under
Robinson, the provision of the INA that provided for deportation of an
addicted alien was a violation of the Eighth Amendment.'" 5 The Ninth
Circuit rejected McJunkin's analogy to Robinson.' 116 The court based this
rejection on the theory that deportation does not rise to the level of a
criminal sanction.'° 7
 The court stated that under the Constitution, the
freedom from criminal sanctions is unrelated to an alien's privilege to
enter or remain in this country and thus, they are subject to different
that deportation is a civil rather than criminal proceeding, and thus no matter how severe the
consequences, Eighth Amendment protections do not apply).
97 See McJunkin, 570 F.2d at 535.
1°.} Id.
LL° See id.
too id.
'Di Id. (quoting Woodby v. INS, '385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966)). The court, however, did not
expressly state what the requisite standard of proof is in an NARA commitment hearing. See id.
at 536 & n.l.
"Mejunkin, 579 Pick at 536.
"Id.
L°4 See id.
LOS U.S. CONS T. amend. VIII; see INA § 241(a) (11); McJunkin, 579 F.2d at 536. For a discussion
of Robinson, see supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
1(x See Robinson, 570 U.S. at 667; McJunkin, 579 F.2d at 536.
l' r7 See McJunkin, 570 F.2d at 536; see also Hatisiades, 342 U.S. at 594; Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893).
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limitations.m8 The Ninth Circuit further noted that Congress has the
plenary power to impose conditions on an alien who wishes to remain
in this country which they could not similarly impose on United States
citizens.'" The court thus upheld McJunkin's deportation order as
being a constitutional exercise of power."°
In 1994, in Pottinger v. Miami, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida held that the city's practice of arresting
homeless persons for performing life-sustaining activities such as sleep-
ing, standing and congregating in public places violated the Eighth
Amendment."' In Pottinger, the plaintiffs were homeless men, women
and children who argued that their status of being homeless was
involuntary and beyond their immediate ability to change.112 They
argued that the conduct for which they were arrested was inseparable
from their status as homeless.'" Relying on Robinson, the court stated
that criminalizing an involuntary status is unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment.'" The plaintiffs in this case, the court stated, had
no choice but to eat, sleep and engage in other life-sustaining activities
in public.' 15 Thus, the court held, arresting them for such conduct was
a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.''`'
Many states have attempted to criminalize a "status," such as ad-
diction or homelessness, but the Supreme Court has declared such
statutes unconstitutional violations of the Eighth Amendment guaran-
tee against "cruel and unusual punishment." 17 The Court struck down
these statutes, reasoning that penalizing a person for an involuntary
status violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment."' Examples of "status" characteristics include age, race,
gender, national origin and illness."°
MrJunkin, 579 F.2(1 at 536.
11111 1d. at 536 (citing Brice v. Pickett, 515 1 1 2d 153 (9th Cir. 1975)).
nit ,rd.
111 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1559, 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see also Joyce v. City and Courtly of
San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 857 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (looking to various factors such as the
involuntariness of the acquisition of that characteristic and the degree to which an individual has
control over that characteristic in determining whether or not a characteristic was a "status").
112 810 F. Supp. at 1561.
See id.
114 Id. at 1561-62; see Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
1111 Pottinger, 810 E Supp. at 1565.
116 Id.
I " See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII; see, e.g., Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67; Adapter, 810 F. Supp.
at 1562.
118 Robinson, 370 U.S. al 666-67; Pottinger, 810 F. Stipp. at 1565.
119 See Joyce, 846 F. Stipp. at 857.
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Thus, although the Supreme Court's decisions clearly reflect a
desire to separate criminal sanctions from deportation, the Supreme
Court has also declared that statutes criminalizing a status are uncoil-
stitutional. 12° McJunkin thus may have been more successful had he
attacked this particular INS provision arguing not that the ultimate
sanction of deportation was cruel and unusual, but rather that the
categorization as an addict was cruel and unusual, and thus in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. 12 ' In Robinson, the Court did not base its
holding on the notion that the actual punishment was cruel and
unusual, but rather on the notion that criminalizing something out of
a person's control was cruel and unusual.' 22
 If the Supreme Court
admonishes the criminalization of the status of addiction, then deport-
ing an individual solely because of his or her addiction would also
violate the Constitution. 125
 Thus, in McJunkin's case, the law is well
settled that he cannot argue that deportation, as a resulting sanction,
was cruel and unusual, but the law is significantly less settled with
respect to the argument that the mere categorization of "addict" is in
and of itself cruel and unusual punishment.' 24
Even if the court were to accept that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits such a categorization, this argument may nevertheless fail
because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment
as applicable only to criminal matters. 12' Though the Court may have
in the past limited Eighth Amendment protections to only those situ-
ations involving a criminal matter, the express language of the Amend-
ment contains no such restriction.' 26
 The Court in Ingraham cites to
the history of the Amendment for support of its holding that the
no See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67; Alrfunkin, 579 F.2d at 536; Palaver, 810 F. Supp.
1565; see also Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 709.
121
 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666; 114dunkin, 579 F.2d at 536.
122 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667. The Court stated, "[do be sure, imprisonment for ninety
days is not, in the abstract, a pun islunent which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot
he considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment
for the 'crime' of having a common cold." Id.
123 See 1NA § 237(a) (2) (13)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a) (2)(B) (ii) (West 1996); Robinson, 370
U.S. at 666. This Note does not challenge the constitutional validity, nor the public policy
concerns, with respect to the grounds of deportation that deal with narcotic criminal offenses.
This provision, however, does not distinguish between those who act upon their addiction in a
criminal manner and those who are innocently afflicted. See INA § 237(2) (B) (i)—(ii) (criminal
offenses as a ground for deportation).
12'1 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67; Mrlunkin, 579 F.2d at 536; Poitingrr, 810 F. Supp. at
1565; see also Harisiadta, 342 U.S. at 594; Fong Yue Tiffg, 149 U.S. at 709.
11.5
	 CoNsT. amend. VIII; see Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664.
126 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664; see also Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 685
(White, J., dissenting).
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Eighth Amendment protects only those convicted of a crime; however,
the majority opinion is unconvincing. 127 Justice White, in his dissenting
opinion in Ingraham, is more persuasive than the tnajority.' 28 In arguing
that the Eighth Amendment is not limited to criminal matters, Justice
White relies on the fact that the Framers deliberately excluded the
word "criminal" in the Amendment and regards such exclusion as
strong evidence that the Amendment was designed to prohibit all
inhumane or barbaric punishments. 129
In addition, the popular definition of "punishment" extends well
beyond criminal sanction, thus a plain language interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment would similarly extend beyond criminal sane-
tion."" According to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, for exam-
ple, one definition of punishment is severe, rough or disastrous treat-
ment."' Categorizing someone as an addict far purposes of
governmental action is arguably "severe, rough or disastrous treat-
ment," and thus under a plain language interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment, this governmental action is subject to the Eighth Amend-
ment limitations regardless al' whether or not the categorization oc-
curred in a criminal or civil setting.
Although it purports to keep alienage issues outside of Eighth
Amendment protections, the United States Supreme Court has to
some level acknowledged that the right to maintain residency in the
United States is a constitutionally protected right."' The observations
in Trop, for example, seem inconsistent with the prevailing view that
deportation does not constitute punishment."" This inconsistency sup-
ports the argument that deportation does in fact rise to the level of
punishment and therefore should enjoy the protections of the Eighth
Amendment. Although the statute in Trop did impose a sanction for a
crime, and thus fell squarely within Eighth Amendment protections,
the Court nonetheless spoke to the harshness of denationalization,
which is similar to deportation."' Thus, if the Supreme Court was
willing to hold that denationalization constitutes cruel and unusual
127 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664-66; see id. at 685 (White, J., dissenting).
128 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
129 See id. (White, J., dissenting).
1311 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; iATEBs'rEtt's NINTH NEW COLLAGIATI: DICTIONARY 955 (1988).
13 ' WHIsTER's, supra, note 130, at 955.
132 See Trop, 356 U.S. at. 101.
133 See id. at 101; see aLso Fong Haw Mtn v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (stating that.
"[deportation] is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country, Such a forfeiture
is a penalty."); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (observing that deportation
may he the equivalent of banishment or exile).
134 356 U.S. at 88, 101.
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punishment because it destroys an individual's status in society, then
deportation, which has similar consequences, must also constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.' i5
In addition, although the notion that deportation is civil, not
criminal, finds support in the case law, many dissenters and scholars
challenge this concept as a legal fiction." 6 In arguing against the Alien
and Sedition Acts, for example, James Madison expressed the belief
that deportation constitutes punishment for Eighth Amendment pur-
poses."' More recently, as judges and lawyers give more consideration
to immigration consequences when contemplating plea arrangements
and imposing sentences, the line the courts had previously drawn
dividing deportation from criminal sanction has blurred."' Thus, sec-
tion 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) of the INA may violate the Eighth Amendment
in two different ways.t 39 First, given the recent trend in treating depor-
tation as if it were a criminal punishment, deportation is, or should be,
within the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual
punishment; thus, section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) is invalid because it is cruel
135 See id. at 101.
136 See, e.g., Trap, 356 U.S. at 98 (stating that the notion that deportation is not punishment
may be highly fictional"); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740 (Brewer. J., dissenting) (stating
that deportation is punishment because it takes an individual away from home, family, friends,
business and property and sends him or her across the ocean to a distant land); United States ex
rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 630 (2d Cir. 1926) (Judge Learned Hand stated that no matter
how heinous a crime, deportation is basically exile, which was a dreadful punishment abandoned
by the common consent of all civilized people).
137 ALEINIKOFF, .supra note 13, at 512-13 (citing 4 Elliot's Debates 555 (Phila.J.B. Lippincott
& Co., 1881 ed.)). James Madison said:
If banishment of an alien from a country into which he has been invited as the
asylum most auspicious to his happiness,—a country where he may have formed
the most tender connections; where he may have invested his entire property, and
acquired property of the real and permanent, as well as the movable and temporary
kind; where he enjoys, under the laws, a greater share of the blessings of personal
security, and personal liberty, than he can elsewhere hope for; ...—if a banishment
of this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be
difficult. to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.
Id.
138 See, e.g., Maryellen Fullerton and Noah Kinigstein, Strategies for Ameliorating the Immigra-
tion Consequences of Criminal Convictions: A Guide for Defense Attorneys, 23 AM. CRIM. L. R_•v. 425,
426 (1986) (interplay between law enforcement and deportation is evident where the INS assigns
immigration investigators to work with state law enforcement in an effort to seek out aliens who
are involved in criminal activity); Daniel M. Kowalski and Daniel C. Horne, Defending the NonCi-
then, 24 U. Colo. L. REv. 2177, 2180 (1995) (under a recent federal statute, prosecutors and
defense counsel may add deportation to the plea bargaining/sentencing mix; under a different
federal statute, a U.S. Attorney may request the federal criminal court to hold a "deportation
hearing").
139 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; INA 4 237(a) (2) (B)(ii).
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and unusual to punish someone due to a disease."() This argument is
not likely to succeed, however, because the actual penalty, deportation,
has traditionally been excluded from Eighth Amendment protection.' 41
Secondly, section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) is unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment because it categorizes an individual as an addict
and imposes a sanction as a result of that status—such categorization
violates the Eighth Amendment. 142 This argument has a greater chance
of success because it does not ask the courts to depart from precedent
to declare that deportation is punishment for Eighth Amendment
purposes, but rather, it argues that any statute that imposes some form
of sanction for an involuntary status violates the Eighth Amendment. 14 '
B. Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution mandates that no state may deny any
person equal protection under the law.'" The law is well settled that
the courts will uphold a legislative classification challenged on equal
protection grounds if it bears a rational relation to some legitimate
end.'''' Where a statute targets a suspect class, however, the courts will
subject the legislative classification to strict scrutiny analysis. 146 A legis-
lative classification will survive strict scrutiny only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."' Because aliens
141 ' See U.S. CoNsT, amend. VIII; INA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii); see also Trap, 356 U.S. at 100 (stating
that the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than dignity of man
and that power to punish should he exercised within limits of civilized standards); Fullerton,
supra note 138, at 426; Kowalski, supra note 138, at 2180.
141 See, e.g., Whitney v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1985) (holding that Eighth Amendment
was only applicable in criminal adjudications); Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664 (same).
CONST. amend. VIII; INA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii); see Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67;
Pot:Inger, 810 F. Supp. at 1562.
143 see, e.g., Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67; Potlinger, 810 E Supp at 1562.
144 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any State
... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
145 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981); Robinson v. Fauver,
932 E Supp. 639, 644 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding that unless a law targets a suspect class, a legislative
classification will be upheld on equal protection grounds so long as it bears a rational relation
to some legitimate end).
14'1 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (holding
that classifications involving suspect class are subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection);
Artway v. Attorney General of N.J., 81 F.3(1 1235, 1267 (3d Cir. 1996) (same); Yokley v. Belaski,
982 F.2d 423, 425 (10th Cir. 1992) (same).
147 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (to pass strict
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are members of a suspect class, classifications based on alienage must
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.' 48
In 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the United States Supreme Court
held that the constitutional promise of equal protection of the laws
applies to aliens as well as to citizens."9 In Yick Wo, a San Francisco
ordinance placed restrictions on the ability to establish a laundry
within the city limits.' 5" Vick Wo, a native of China and a legal resident
of the United States, was arrested for violating this statute. 151 Yick Wo
argued that this statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the statute had the effect of discrimi-
nating against the Chinese because Chinese immigrants had estab-
lished most of the laundry fitcilities. 152 The Court ruled that the Equal
Protection Clause protected aliens as well as citizens)" Thus, the Court
held that because this statute, though fair and impartial on its face,
unjustly discriminated against the Chinese, it violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 154
In 1971, in Graham v. Richardson, the United States Supreme
Court struck down Arizona and Pennsylvania statutes that disqualified
aliens from receiving various forms of welfare assistance. 155 In Graham,
the aliens sought welfare benefits tinder their respective state statutes,
but the states denied them the benefits. 156 The Arizona statute required
fifteen years residence for non-citizens to become eligible for benefits,
and the Pennsylvania statute denied the benefits to all aliens, regard-
less of residency) 57 The Court acknowledged that aliens as a class are
a prime example of a "discrete and insular" minority, and thus held
that the statutes were subject to strict scrutiny analysis. 158 In order to
pass strict scrutiny, legislation that involves a suspect class must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest)" The states
justified the statutes on the ground that they preserved welfare benefits
scrutiny review, the legislation must he narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental
interest); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (same).
148
 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; see also Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3(1 716, 726 (2d Cir. 1996), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (listing aliens among those groups who qualify as a suspect class).
149 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
Id. at 357.
151 See id. at 357, 358.
152 See id. at 369, 374.
153 Id.
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.
155 403 U.S. 365, 366, 368, 376 (1971).
156 Id. at 366-68, 368-70.
157 See id. at 367-68.
158 Id. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U,S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)),
155
 See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273-74; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at. 439; Graham, 403 U.S. at 376.
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for citizens.'"" The Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to the chal-
lenged statutes and concluded that the slates' interest in preserving
welfare benefits for their own citizens did not justify the denial of those
same benefits to aliens.'"'
In 1980, in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., the Supreme
Court upheld a state statute banning plastic non-returnable milk con-
tainers on the grounds that such classification was rationally related to
a legitimate state interest. 162 The respondents argued that the classifica-
tion between plastic and non-plastic non-returnable milk containers
unfairly discriminated against them.'" 3 The state identified several rea-
sons for the ban and produced evidence to show how the ban on
non-plastic non-returnable milk containers furthered its interests.'"
Both parties agreed that because the classification did not involve a
suspect class, the appropriate standard of review of the Equal Protec-
tion claim was the "rational basis" test.'" 5 The Court stated that where
there was evidence before the legislature reasonably supporting the
classification, the legislation must be upheld.'"" Thus, the Court held
that this legislative classification was rationally related to a state interest
and upheld the statute.'" 7
In 1986, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the United States
Supreme Court struck down an affirmative action plan because the
plan was not sufficiently narrowly tailored and thus violated the Equal
Protection Clause.'"" The case arose when, in response to racial ten-
sion, the Jackson Board of Education ("the Board") considered adding
a layoff provision ("Article XII") to the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment ("CBA") between the Board and the Jackson Education Union.'""
The plan, as originally considered, was designed to protect minority
employees. 17" The Board initially failed to comply with Article XII but
ultimately began to adhere to the provision, which resulted in the
layoff of nonminority teachers.' 7 ' The displaced nonminority teachers
brought suit arguing that Article XII violated the Equal Protection
16° See Graham 403 U.S. at 372.
161 Id. at 376.
162 449 U.S. 456, 470 (1980).
163 See id. at 958 &
169
	 id. at 465-70.
165 See id. at 461.
11O Id, at 464.
167 Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 470.
1111' 476 U.S. 267, 270, 272, 283-84 (1986).
169 See id. at 270.
170 See id.
171 See id. at 271, 272.
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Clause."2 The Court first recognized that because the classification in
Article XII was based on race—a suspect class—strict scrutiny was the
appropriate level of review."' The Court identified the two prongs of
this analysis."' First, any racial classification must be justified by a
compelling government interest and, second, the means chosen to
effectuate that goal must be narrowly tailored.'" The Court concluded
that while the Board's interest in providing minority role models for
its minority students was compelling, Article XII was not sufficiently
narrowly tailored.'" The Court thus held that the Board's selection of
layoffs as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose violated the
Equal Protection Clause.'"
INA section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) creates two possible classifications.'"
First, the statute classifies an alien as either an addict or a non-addict.'"
Because diseased individuals do not constitute a suspect class, the
standard of review for equal protection purposes is whether the clas-
sification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' 8°
Arguably, Congress has recognized that the drug problem in this coun-
try is important enough to pass legislation that seeks to eradicate the
problem.' 81 This justification fails, however, when we take into account
that this provision has the effect of deporting individual aliens who in
actuality pose no threat to the safety of the nation. 182 A classification is
"overinclusive" if it disadvantages some people who do not in fact
threaten the government's interest's' Although an overinclusive stat-
ute does not automatically render the statute unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause, it is certainly a factor a court should
consider in making the rational basis deterrnination.' 84 A classification
172 See id. at 272.
175 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273-74.
174 Id. at 274.
175 See id.
"6 Id, at 274, 283-84.
177 Id. at 283-84.
178 See INA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii), 8 U.S.C.A § 1227(a) (2) (B) (ii) (West 1996).
179 See id.
18° See, e.g., Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 470; Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1067 (6th
Cir. 1994) (status of being an alcoholic is not a suspect class for equal protection purposes); Pierce
v. King, 918 F. Stipp. 932, 942 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (disabled individuals do not constitute a suspect
class).
181 See INA § 237(a) (2) (B)(ii),
182 See id.
122 See GI,:0ITREY R. STONE ET Al.., CONSTITUTIONAL. LAW 568 (3d ed. 1996).
184 See SruNE, supra note 183, at 568. "It seems clear therefore that the permissibility of a
legislative generalization must turn on the cost of the generalization as compared to the cost of
a more individualized judgment." Id.
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that may result in overinclusion tends to undercut the governmental
claim that the classification serves legitimate political ends. Take Made-
line, for example. If she were to seek assistance under the NARA as
McJunkin did, the INS could place her in deportation proceedings,
subject only to the Attorney General's discretion.' 85 Given that she has
been in the United States for seventy years, it is highly unlikely that
the Attorney General would deny a waiver request, but deportation
nevertheless remains a possibility. If the INS did deport her, they would
unlikely be able to demonstrate how a legitimate governmental end
was achieved. Thus, in order to pass constitutional muster, the statute
should take into consideration the potential overinclusiveness of a
literal application of section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) . 186
Second, section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) classifies individuals as addicted
citizens versus addicted aliens.' 87
 The courts subject legislation that
involves a suspect class to strict scrutiny.' 88 Suspect classes are those
identified by race, alienage or national origin.' 89
 To survive strict scru-
tiny, legislation classifying a suspect class must be narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling governmental interest.m
The plenary authority to regulate immigration extends to the
classification of aliens as a basis for determining their eligibility to
remain in the United States, thus, the courts have determined that
these classifications are not entitled to strict scrutiny analysis.' 91
 Courts
apply rational basis review to deportation statutes that establish clas-
sifications.' 92 The equal protection argument unsuccessfully advanced
against these deportation statutes, however, differs from the equal
protection argument advanced in this Note against section
237(a) (2) (B) 00.' 93 The argument here is not that Congress cannot
classify someone as an alien and establish certain requirements to
determine his or her eligibility to remain.' 94 Rather, the equal protec-
tion argument is that by nature of its sanction (deportation), section
185 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
186 See INA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii).
187 See id.
1844 See, e.g., Wyganl, 476 U.S. at 274; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Quill, 80 F.3d at 726.
189 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; see also Quill, 80 F.3c1 at 726.
I° See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Quill, 80 F.3d at 726.
191 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U,S. 787,792 (1977); Giusto v. INS, 9 F.3d 8,9 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating
that because of Congress's plenary power, statutes relating to immigration matters arc subject
only to rational basis review).
192 See Giusto, 9 F.3(1 at 10.
193 See INA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii); Giusto, 9 F,3d at 9-10.
194
 See Giusto, 9 F.3d at 10 (alien unsuccessfully argued that Congress could not classify aliens
(1hr deportation purposes) on the basis of time served for a crime).
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237(a) (2) (B) (ii) effectively discriminates against aliens who wish to
seek treatment for their addicfion. 193
 Thus, strict scrutiny should apply
because this provision involves a suspect class in that it classifies an
addict as either alien or non-alien.' 96
Section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) classifies between alien addicts and citi-
zen addicts. 197 This classification arguably disadvantages the suspect
class, alien addicts, by effectively denying them the ability to seek
treatment, either under the NARA or by means of other treatment
options, such as Alcoholics Anonymous or drug rehabilitation centers.
Alien addicts who are aware of section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) may be reluc-
tant to seek treatment for fear that the INS will learn of their addiction
and subsequently deport them.'" Thus, because this provision discrimi-
nates against a suspect class, aliens, section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) is subject
to strict scrutiny."'" In order to survive strict scrutiny, this provision
must be narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling governmental
interest. 200
 The stated legislative purpose of this provision is to crack
down on drug abuse."' Although this undeniably constitutes a legiti-
mate governmental interest, the issue is whether on balance it is a
compelling enough interest to result in the extreme consequence of
deportation. Even if this is a compelling governmental interest, the
provision nevertheless fails a strict scrutiny analysis because the provi-
sion is not narrowly tailored." 2
 On the contrary, the provision makes
no distinction between the type of addiction nor takes into considera-
tion the factors surrounding the addiction. 213 The classification sweeps
too broadly in that many aliens who do not threaten the government's
interest may nevertheless qualify for deportation.204
C. Fifth Amendment Procedural Due Process Violations
Section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) of the INA violates the Constitution be-
cause it deprives an alien of his or her procedural due process rights
1 " See INA § 237(a) (2)(B) (ii); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 490; Quill, 80 F.3d at 726.
196 See INA § 237(a) (2)(B) (ii); see, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Quill, 80 F.3d at 726.
197 See INA § 237(a) (2)(B) (ii).
1 " See id.
199 See id; see also 145:gant, 476 U.S. at 274; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Quill, 80 F.3d at 726.
290 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372; see also Wygant, 470 U.S. at 274; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439;
Quill, 80 F.3d at 726.
" 1 See INA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii); H.R. REP. No. 101-723, at 55 (1990), reprinted in 199{}
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710,6735.
202 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372; see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
203 See INA § 237(a) (2)(B) (ii). See infra notes 273-91 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the void for vagueness challenge.
219 See INA § 237(a) (2)(B) (ii).
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under the Fifth Amendment. 205 Even though Congress has the absolute
and inherent right to decide who may remain in this country, the Bill
of Rights protects aliens in non-immigration contexts. 2° Specifically, in
criminal contexts aliens have the same rights as citizens. 217 The Fifth
Amendment guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty
without due process of law, and to accomplish this goal, a criminal
defendant has the right to present a defense. 2us Deportation based on
addiction could have the effect of inhibiting an alien's presentation of
his or her defense in a criminal trial or could have an effect on the
sentence ultimately imposed if an alien is convicted.
In 1972, in Chambers v. Mississippi, the United States Supreme
Court held that the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State's accusation is the essence of the due process rights of an ac-
cused. 209 In Chambers, the petitioner was tried and convicted of mur-
dering a police officer. 2 '" As part of his defense, petitioner wished to
cross-examine the individual whom the petitioner alleged to have com-
mitted the murder:111 The trial court denied him the opportunity to
cross-examine on the basis of a state common law rule prohibiting a
party from impeaching his or her own witness. 2 ' 2 The Supreme Court
stated that the right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule
of trial procedure, but rather a component of the constitutional right
of confrontation. 2 " Because this right is an essential and fundamental
element of a fair trial, the Court held that the denial of this right
violated due process. 21  The Court thus reversed the defendant's con-
viction and held that the due process right of an accused in a criminal
trial is protected by the right to a fair opportunity to defend against
the State's accusations.'''
In 1977, in United States v. Henricksen, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that substantial government interfer-
205 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: INA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii). The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment provides in pertinent part: "bib() person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. QiNsT. amend. V.
2(1' See ALIO N KOFF, SUPra note 13, at 527; see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,
238 (1896) (affording Filth and Sixth Amendment protections to aliens, but only with respect to
criminal sanctions).
207 See Wang Wing, 10 U.S. at 238.
208 See U.S. Conrs•r. amend. V; Chambers v, Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 204 (1072).
2°9 410 U.S. at 294.
210
 Id. at 285.
211 See id. at 291-02.
212 See id. at 295.
213 hi,
214 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
2 "" Id. at 294,
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ence with a defense witness's free and unhampered choice to testify
violates due process. 216
 The prosecution charged the defendant with
various drug offenses:2 ' 7
 The defendant, as part of her defense, wished
to call a codefendant to testify because the codefendant's testimony
would have tended to exonerate the defendant. 218
 As part of his plea,
however, the codefendant had to agree not to testify. 219 Because the
codefendant's plea agreement adversely affected the defendant's de-
fense, the court reasoned that the government should not have im-
posed that requirement on the codefendant. 22° Thus, the court held
that a due process violation occurs when the government substantially
interferes with a defendant's right to present her defense. 22 '
In 1978, in United States v. Paige, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the defendant would
be severely prejudiced if he were deterred from testifying by the fear
that he would be convicted on the basis of a prior crime. 222 In Paige,
the defendant was charged with knowing receipt and concealment of
stolen securities. 223
 The prosecution wished to produce evidence of
defendant's prior criminal record and the defendant objected on the
grounds of prejudice. 224
 The court stated that if the defendant chose
to take the stand, he may not be able to adequately explain his prior
criminal history to the jury's satisfaction, and thus the jury may infer
guilt of the present crime. 225 The court stated that such an inference
unfairly shifts the burden of proof to the defendant.226 The court
concluded that if the defendant is deterred from testifying for fear that
the inadequate explanation of the prior crime would ultimately convict
him, then the defendant is unfairly prejudiced. 227
 The court thus ex-
cluded the evidence of the defendant's prior conviction. 228
216 564 F.2d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 703
(5th Cir. 1980) (holding that threats against witnesses constituted substantial government inter-
ference with a defense witness's free and unhampered choice to testify and thus violated due
process).
217 See Henricksen, 564 F.2d at 198.
21./ See id.
219 See id.
22° See Id.
221 Id.
222
 464 F. Stipp. 99, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
223 7d. at 100.
224 See id.
225 Id.
2261d.
227 Paige, 464 F. Stipp. at 100.
228 Id.
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In 1996, in United States v. Workman, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that post-arrest rehabilitation may
justify downward departures in sentences under appropriate circum-
stances.'" In Workman, the defendant was convicted of various charges
relating to narcotics trafficking and conspiracy.'"' The trial judge de-
parted from the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines")
and relaxed the sentence based on the defendant's rehabilitation, and
the Government appealed such departure." The Second Circuit affir-
med the departure stating that the trial judge acted fully within his
authority in granting a downward departure for rehabilitation.'2n
Section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) constructively interferes with the defen-
dant's free and unhampered choice to testify.'"" A defendant charged
with public drunkenness, for example, may wish to testify that he or
she has an addiction. He or she may believe that such testimony,
though it does not by itself relieve him or her of criminal responsibility,
could elicit sympathy from the fact-finder, and this sympathy could
help in an acquittal. An alien defendant who is aware of section
237(a) (2) (B) (ii) may choose not to testify about his or her addiction
for fear of deportation.l "A Thus, section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) is unconstitu-
tional under the Fifth Amendment because it interferes with a defen-
dant's free and unhampered choice to testify.';`'
Under the Guidelines, a defendant in a prosecution for a federal
crime is sometimes entitled to a downward departure in sentencing." 6
Though not specifically mentioned as a ground for departure, many
courts reduce a sentence based on either a defendant's rehabilitation
effort or his or her acceptance of responsibility.'"' In the cases where
Z"80 F.3d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United Slates v. Williams, 37 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that defendant's rehabilitative efforts in ending his drug dependence may be
permissible ground for downward departure), appeal after remand, 65 F.3d 301 (1995); United
States v. Maddalena, 893 E2d 815, 818 (6th Cir. 1989) (same), appeal after remand, 931 F.2d 57
(1991). But see United States v. Deigert, 916 F.2d 916, 919 n.2 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that drug
abuse, even under extraordinary circumstances, may not support downward departure under the
Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 1'29, 130 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a
defendant's drug rehabilitation is nut a ground for departure).
236 80 F.3d at 692.
231 See id. at 701.
a Id. at 701-02.
'233 See INA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii).
254 See id.
'135 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; INA § 237(a) (2) (B)(ii); Henricksen, 564 F.2d at 198; Paige, 464
F. Stipp. at 100.
"6 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
237 See Workman, 80 F.3d at 701; .J. Gordon Seymour, Downward Departures from the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Based on the Defendant's Drug Rehabilitative Efforts, 59 Cm. L. REv. 837, 840
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courts consider drug rehabilitation efforts when departing from the
Guidelines, the courts are not acknowledging that alcohol or drug use
excused or justified the offense, but rather acknowledging that the
rehabilitation effort can serve merely as a factor to consider in deter-
mining the appropriate sentence. 238
Although some courts have not accepted drug addiction and
efforts at rehabilitation as grounds for downward departure, there
nevertheless remains the possibility that a court may so choose, and
therefore, section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) infringes on the defendant's right
to present a defense. 2" If courts may depart from the Guidelines
when a defendant either accepts responsibility or attempts to undergo
rehabilitation, section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) could deprive an alien of his or
her due process rights during a criminal proceeding.24° An alien,
such as Carlos in the scenario set out above, may be reluctant to admit
his or her addiction for fear of deportation pursuant to section
237(a) (2) (B) 00. 241 if the alien feels constrained in presenting his or
her defense, one could construe that as a due process violation. 242
D. Fifth Amendment Substantive Due Process Violations
Section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) violates substantive due process under
the Fifth Amendment because it deprives an alien of his or her liberty
interest of participating in drug and alcohol rehabilitation. 2" Substan-
tive due process prevents a state from depriving an individual of his or
her liberty or property interests without due process of law. 2" An
individual has a liberty interest in remaining healthy and taking meas-
(1992); see, e.g., Williams, 37 F.3d at 86; Maddalena, 893 F.2d at 818. But see Pharr, 916 E2c1 at
132.
238 See, e.g., Williams, 37 F.3d at 86; Maddalena, 893 F.2d at 818; Seymour, supra note 237, at
840.
239 INA § 237(a) (2) (11) (ii); see,  e.g., Workman, 80 F.3d at 701; Williams, 37 F.3d at 86; beigert,
916 F.2d at 919 n.2; Pharr, 916 F.2d at 130; Maddalena, 893 F.2d at 818; Seymour, supra note 237,
at 840.
240 See INA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii).
241 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(ii). This challenge assumes that the
particular offense that the alien is charged with is not in and of itself a ground for deportation.
See INA § 237(2) (a). In Carlos' case, for example, public drunkenness would not be a deportable
offense, unless a particular court construes such a statute to be a crime of "moral turpitude." See
id. Even in that case, the statute allows fOr exceptions to deportation in those instances. See id.
242 See Paige, 464 F. Stipp. at 100.
1 't3 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; INA § 237(a)(2) (B) (ii). The Fifth Amendment Substantive
Due Process Clause states, in pertinent part: "[rib person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
214 U.S. CONST. amend. V,
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ures to ensure one's own health and safety. 245 A legal alien enjoys the
same constitutional and statutory protections that are afforded to citi-
zens.246
In 1985, in Baldi v. City of Philadelphia, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the Constitu-
tion guarantees the right to be free from undue state interference or
hindrance in promptly obtaining or attempting to obtain available
medical treatment when it is needed. 247 In Baldi, a friend was transport-
ing the decedent, plaintiff's husband, to the hospital and the police
stopped the vehicle for a traffic violation."' Plaintiff alleged that the
state violated the decedent's civil rights because the police action
deprived the decedent of life or liberty without due process of law. 2'19
The court did not accept plaintiff's argument that there is a general
constitutional right to receive medical treatment absent state custody. 25°
The court did, however, state that the liberty interests of the Due
Process Clause encompass the right to promptly seek available medical
care without undue state interference or hindrance irrespective of the
state's custody or control over an individual. 251
In 1990, in Colon v. Schneider, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that in order to demonstrate a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest, an individual must establish that he
or she has a legitimate claim of entitlement to 4. 25' In Colon, the
petitioner, an inmate, brought an action alleging that a corrections
officer violated his liberty interest when the officer used mace against
the petitioner.'" Petitioner relied on a Wisconsin statute that governed
the use of mace in disciplining inmates. 254 In determining the existence
of a liberty interest, the court examined whether petitioner had a
legitimate claim of entitlement to be free from the use of mace. 255
245 See Balch v. City of Phila., (109 F. Supp. 162, 167 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
246 See 1 4bug Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that aliens are persons
guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Vick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 309 (1886) (same).
247 609 F. Supp. at 167.
248 1d. at 165.
249 See id.
250 Id. at 166.
251 1d. at 167.
252 899 F.2d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 1990).
2" ld. at 665.
294 See id. at 667, The statute prohibited the use of mace for refusal to obey an order except
in an emergency. See Wis. Ansurv. ConE § HSS 306.08(5)(6); Co/on, 899 F.2d at 603.
255 Colon, 899 E2d at 666-67.
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In order for a state regulation to create a constitutionally protected
liberty interest, the regulations must employ mandatory language. 256
The court concluded that although the Wisconsin statute limited the
permissible use of mace, it did not contain mandatory language, and
thus held that the statute did not create a constitutionally protected
liberty interest."7
Section 2 of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act ("NARA")
represents congressional intent to commit for treatment, rather than
criminally punish, certain persons charged or convicted of narcotics
violations who are narcotics addicts and who are likely to be rehabili-
tated through treatment. 258 In enacting NARA, Congress intended that
certain persons addicted to narcotic drugs who are not charged with
a criminal offense should be afforded the opportunity to be committed
for treatment. 259 Under section 2, a person who believes himself or
herself to be a narcotic addict may petition for voluntary treatment,
and, similarly, a person who believes that a relative may be a narcotics
addict may petition for treatment on behalf of the relative. 261
An act of Congress that has the effect of establishing a statutory
right constitutes a liberty interest for purposes of substantive due proc-
ess
 rights.261 The Fifth Amendment protects individuals against arbi-
trary governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property. 262 In dem-
onstrating a constitutionally protected liberty interest, an individual
must establish that he or she has a legitimate claim of entitlement to
such interest. 2H A state or federal regulation creates a constitutionally
protected liberty interest when the regulation employs language of a
mandatory character. 2"
Voluntary civil confinement as provided by the NARA establishes
a constitutionally protected liberty interest because the statute uses
mandatory language. 265 The statute states,
[a]fter considering such [voluntary petition for civil commit-
ment], the United States attorney shall, if he determines that
256 See id. at 667; see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1990) (holding that
mandatory language in a state regulation creates a constitutionally protected liberty interest).
'257 Colon, 899 F.2d at 669.
258
 NARA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 3401 (1994).
259 See id.
2SO Id.
26 ' See, e.g., Hewitt, 459 U.S, at 471-72; C'olon, 899 F.2d at 667.
252 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
253 See, e.g., Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72; Colon, 899 F.2d at 667.
264 See, e.g., Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72; Colon, 899 F.2d at 667.
265 See e.g., NARA § 302; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72; Colon, 899 F.2d at 667.
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the person named in such petition is a narcotic addict, .. .
file a petition with the United States district court to commit
such person to a hospital of the Service for treatment . . . . 2"6
Because the NARA establishes a constitutionally protected liberty
interest, the mere existence of section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) effectively
deprives an individual of that liberty interest. 267 An alien addict
who is aware of the consequences of section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) may
choose not to avail himself or herself of this constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest, and thus section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) violates
substantive due process.
Thus, if a statute interferes with or hinders an individual in ob-
taining medical treatment, which section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) arguably
does, then the statute unconstitutionally violates substantive due proc-
ess rights. 268 Section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) contemplates undue interfer-
ence or hindrance for purposes of a substantive due process viola-
tion. 26" Aliens enjoy the same protections that Congress affords to
citizens in all situations except in the deportation context. 27" Thus, they
are equally entitled to enjoy the protections and the benefit of reha-
bilitation as enunciated in the NARA. 271 Unfortunately, an alien who is
aware of section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) will choose not to participate in the
NARA's benefits and this constitutes a constructive deprivation of a
legitimate liberty interest. 272
III. VOID FOR VAGUENESS
Congress should repeal section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) because it is un-
constitutionally vague and does not provide any standards by which a
person of reasonable intelligence would be able to understand what
type of conduct is prohibited. 27'
21''6 NARA § 302 (emphasis added).
2117 See INA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii); NARA § 3412.
26"See TNA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii); Baldi, 609 E Supp. at 167; see also McJunkin v. INS, 579 E2d
533, 535 (9th Cir. 1978) (alien deported after trying to obtain, under the NARA, needed medical
treatment for his addiction).
269 See [NA § 237(a) (2) (B) (ii); see also &Hi, 609 F. Supp. at 167.
27"See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 499 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1990) (holding that
aliens arc entitled to constitutional protections when they have come within the United Stales
and have developed substantial connections with this country); United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d
417, 419 (7th Cir. 1986) (aliens are guaranteed due process and equal protection under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments).
271 See, e.g., NARA § 302; Verdugo-Urquide., 494 U.S. at 270-71; Gomez, 797 F.2d at 419.
272 See INA § 237(a}(2) (b) (ii); see also McJunkin, 579 F.2d at 535.
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In 1988, in Maynard v. Cartwright, the United States Supreme
Court held that objections to vagueness under the Due Process Clause
rest on lack of notice, and hence, may be overcome in any specific case
in which reasonable persons would know their conduct is at risk. 274 In
Maynard, the defendant was tried and convicted of murdering his
former employers. 275
 The jury imposed the death penalty after conclud-
ing that a statutory aggravating circumstance existed—the murder was
"especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."276 The Supreme Court ac-
cepted the defendant's argument that the statute defining the relevant
aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague because it did
not provide the jury with precise standards with which to determine a
sentence. 277
 The Court held that the language of the statute did not
provide the jury with sufficient guidance and thus was unconstitution-
ally vague and a violation of due process. 278
In 1996, in Upton v. SEC, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that due process requires that laws give a
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what
conduct is prohibited.279 In Upton, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC") censured the petitioner for failing reasonably to su-
pervise a subordinate employee who aided and abetted in a violation
of an SEC rule. 28° Petitioner argued that he did not have sufficient
notice of the rule upon which the SEC relied.281
 The court acknow-
ledged that the SEC is entitled to broadly construe its own rules, and
may determine specific applications on a case-by-case basis. 282 The
court stated, however, that the SEC is not entitled to substantial defer-
ence when doing so would penalize an individual who has not received
fair notice of a regulatory violation.'" Thus, the court vacated the
SEC's censure order holding that due process requires that laws give
a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited.'"
274 486 U.S. at 361.
275 1d. at 358.
276
 See id, at 359.
277 Id. at 359, 361, 363-64.
278 Id. at 359, 361, 364.
2741
	 1'.3d at 98.
28" Id. at 93.
281
 See id. at 97-98.
282 Id. at 97.
285 Id. at 98.
284 Upton, 75 F.3d at 98; see Smith v. Avitio, 91 Rid 105, 108 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1996) (holding that
in order to pass constitutional muster, a statute must give person of ordinary intelligence a
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Section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) only contains language providing that
the INS may deport an alien drug addict or abuser. 285 It allows for
deportation if such a condition existed at any time after entry. 28" Ac-
cording to the plain language of the provision, an individual whose
addiction to narcotics results in dangerous propensities may find him-
self or herself in deportation proceedings. 287 Likewise, an individual
who is a recovering alcoholic who attends Alcoholic Anonymous meet-
ings regularly may find himself or herself in deportation proceed-
ings. 288 Even more shocking, an individual who smokes two packs of
cigarettes a day and is admittedly addicted to nicotine may, under the
plain language of the provision, find himself or herself in deporta-
tion proceedings. 28" Section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) is unconstitutionally
vague because it does not give a person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what behavior is prohibited and it
does not provide explicit standards for those who apply 4. 2" With
respect to section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii), an alien would unlikely realize that
by undergoing medical treatment for cancer (where the possibility of
becoming dependent on pain killers is significant), the alien is putting
himself or herself at risk of cleportation. 291 Likewise, an alien who
enters the United States, unaware that he or she is predisposed to
alcoholism, would unlikely realize that the act of taking one drink, and
thus triggering her disease, would result in deportation.
CONCLUSION
Congress should repeal section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) because it vio-
lates several different provisions of the United States Constitution.m It
violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment in that it categorizes an individual as an addict, and
the Supreme Court has ruled that such a categorization is unconstitu-
tional. This provision violates an alien's equal protection rights because
it either classifies an individual based on his or her addiction, in which
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited and provide explicit standards for those who
apply it to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement); Recycling Indus. Inc. v. City of New
York, 928 F. Supp, 407, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same).
288 See INA § 237(a) (2)(B) (ii) , 8 U.S,C.A. § 1227(a) (2) (B) (ii) (West 1996).
288 See id.
287
 See id.
288 See id.
289 See id.
290 See, e.g., Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361; Upton, 75 F.3d at 98.
291 See INA § 237(a) (2) (b) (ii).
292 See id.
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case the legislation is overinclusive and thus not rationally related to a
legitimate state interest; or in the alternative, it classifies an individual
based on alienage, in which case the legislation fails strict scrutiny
review because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest. Section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) violates procedural due proc-
ess under the Fifth Amendment because it could have the effect of hin-
dering or infringing upon an individual's right to a fair criminal trial.
Similarly, it violates substantive due process under the Fifth Amend-
ment in that it interferes with an individual's liberty interest in obtain-
ing medical treatment. Finally, [NA section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii) is uncon-
stitutionally vague because the language of the provision fails to
provide standards by which a person of reasonable intelligence would
be able to understand what type of conduct the statute prohibits.
Although not entirely immune from constitutional challenges, it
is well settled that the judiciary applies deferential treatment to immi-
gration statutes. Congress may have exceptionally broad authority to
promulgate laws governing the expulsion of aliens, but Congress must
nevertheless remain within the confines of the United States Constitu-
tion. Thus, if the courts are unwilling, or unable, to strike down this
provision, then it is the responsibility of Congress to recognize the
constitutional infirmities of section 237(a) (2) (B) (ii).
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